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Business Failures and the Small-Business Man
By Robert B. Hawthorn
If one were to ask one of his small-business acquaintances his
opinion concerning the future of his business, he would probably
say that the day had passed when a man with a small amount of
capital could go into business and succeed or that the competition
of the chain stores and the large independents is making it almost
impossible for the small, local storekeeper to stay in business.
The reason for his believing this is more psychological than
factual, for there appears to be little evidence to support either of
these conclusions. Of course, if he accepts without further
thought or analysis some of the failure statistics of one of the
larger credit agencies, there might be some reason for believing
that the small business is sinking into oblivion. It will be helpful
to review and briefly analyse these statistics before coming to any
conclusion.
The Bradstreet Company, which in 1933 merged with its rival,
R. G. Dun & Co., reported in its 1932 yearbook that of some
31,700 concerns which failed in the United States and Canada in
1932, more than 28,000 or 89.3%, had not more than $20,000 of
capital. Bradstreet further reported that in the decade from 1923
to 1932 the failures numbered some 217,300, and that the failures
for 1932 were over four times those of 1919 (the year in which the
smallest number was recorded since 1880).
On the face of such revelations, it might appear that Mr. SmallBusiness Man knew what he was talking about. But if he con
siders that the actual number of new businesses exceeded the
failures during the same period by 48,000, this large number of
failures should not arouse undue pessimism. The same may be
said for the fact that the failures for 1932 were more than four
times greater than those of 1919. It must be remembered that in
1919 nearly all of us shared in the prosperity following the world
war, which left nearly all of Europe prostrate and largely de
pendent upon our unlimited and unimpaired resources. Nor
should we lose sight of the fact that 1919, the year in which it may
be said nobody complained about bad business, has been used as a
kind of yardstick by both large and small in measuring the amount
of business which they think should gravitate to them, forgetting
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that then the main problem was getting merchandise to sell, not,
as now, one of finding someone to buy it.
Probably the best indication that the small-business man is in
error in believing that he is headed for the rocks is a comparison of
the percentage of failures among small businesses for 1932 with the
percentages for 1930 and 1931. This is the acid test. Those fail
ing whose capital was $20,000 or less, it was noted, were 89 out of
every 100. Does this not compare favorably with 95 for 1931 and
96 for 1930? Does this not indicate that there was a decline of
some 7% in the proportionate number of small-business failures
from 1930 to 1932 and a proportionate increase in the large?
Does this not indicate that the small business is decidedly holding
its own?
The average small business man looks into the future with fore
boding. Rarely does he consider what he hears and reads in the
light of its real economic meaning. When his business is bad he
usually blames others who, in most cases, have had little or noth
ing to do with it. He never stops to consider that his trouble
might be himself—his own shortcomings. While nearly every
small-business man and every street-corner economist has a dif
ferent view regarding the depression, its cause and its ultimate
effect upon society, they all agree that the “chains ” and the larger
independents are primarily responsible for the predicament of the
small merchant. In fact, so much of this sort of thing has been
said that many have given up and are now only waiting for their
creditors to come along and close them up.
There has been a great deal of talk to the effect that one can not
operate a business without capital—and by this is meant more
capital than the average small business employs. Not only have
the small merchants themselves advanced this argument, but
it has been encouraged by large credit agencies and the Mainstreet commentators, whose opinions out of half-knowledge have
had much to do with moulding the minds of the small, local store
keepers.
It is manifestly true that there have been more failures among
small businesses than there should have been; but to say that lack
of capital has been the principal cause is, I think, to place too
much emphasis on only one of the possible causes of failure.
But what, it may be asked, are the real underlying causes of the
many failures? The question is indeed difficult to answer; it can
hardly be answered to the satisfaction of all of us. Bradstreet,
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for one, for a number of years attempted to classify them, but
there was left much room for controversy. Bradstreet stated
that lack of capital is unequivocally the predominant cause.
The following is a list of the causes of failure for 1932, and the
relative percentage of each to the total, as taken from Bradstreet’s
Business Year Review, issue January 28, 1933:
Incompetence.......................................................................... 13.6%
Inexperience...............................................................................
3.0
Lack of capital...................................................................... 30.2
Unwise credits............................................................................
1.0

Total internal cause........................................................
Extravagance..........................................................................
Neglect....................................................................................
Fraud.......................................................................................
Speculation..............................................................................
Total culpable internal cause.........................................
Competition............................................................................
Unfavorable circumstances....................................................
Failure of others.....................................................................

Total external cause.......................................................

47.8%
0.2%
0.3
0.5
0.1
1.1

1.1
49.0
1.0

51.1

100.0%

Of the personal or “internal” causes, according to this sum
mary, lack of capital has led the field, with incompetence and
inexperience. Taken together, a fairly close second. Inasmuch
as there is little to distinguish them, the two have been combined
here in order to eliminate the possibility of confusion. Obviously,
if a man is inexperienced, he is also incompetent—at least he is
incompetent until he acquires experience. A man may be a good
carpenter, for example, and yet prove himself wholly inefficient
if called upon to manage the affairs of a large lumber mill or furni
ture factory. As I see it, almost all of Bradstreet’s internal causes,
both culpable and inculpable, are closely related.
Many small-business men are, no doubt, doomed to failure from
the start, simply because they have not the remotest idea of the
capital that is necessary or what knowledge they should possess to
insure the success of their undertaking. Failure in such cases
might be attributed, not only to lack of capital, but to several other
things as well.
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The following episode will illustrate the folly of attempting to
attribute to some one cause each of the thousands of business
failures:
Some few years ago I knew a man, a salesman for one of the
fairly large instalment houses, who became dissatisfied with his
position and resigned. He felt confident that he could succeed
with a store of his own. With the little money he had saved up
and with what else he was able to borrow from his credulous rela
tives, he started out, endeavoring to compete with his former em
ployer. His whole capital outlay did not exceed $8,000 or $9,000.
To complete the story, he bought at the outset some $15,000 of
merchandise, $10,000 of which was on credit, rented a large store,
and spent nearly the entire balance of his money, about $3,000, on
fixtures, before selling a dollar’s worth of merchandise. He set
out to do the volume of business his former employer had done—
and did do it. The sheriff closed up the business eighteen months
afterward.
I should like to know how Bradstreet classified my friend,
whether his failure was charged to lack of capital or to inexperience
—or to what. My guess is that all the causes under the first
caption and perhaps one or two under the second or third were
responsible. If, however, I were forced to decide definitely, my
conclusion, like Bradstreet’s, would be purely a guess, notwith
standing that I know intimately the man and his methods of do
ing business. Had this man had more capital he might have
eventually succeeded; he might have been able to overcome his
costly errors of judgment and have made a success. On the other
hand, he probably would have failed anyway. Incompetence
and inexperience as a rule go hand in hand with lack of capital. If
a man ventures into business without sufficient capital, there is
usually some other weakness more serious and deep-rooted.
Capital deficiency sometimes has its virtues as well as its vices.
Someone once asked one of our so-called captains of industry
what was the cause of his success. His reply was: "Lack of
capital.” Personally, I am inclined to believe that, if the facts
were known, lack of capital, without incompetence or inexperience
projecting themselves into the picture, would be found actually
responsible for far less than 30% of the total failures.
The importance of lack of capital as a cause of failure has been
much discounted in an investigation of 512 failures in 1930 in
New Jersey, made by the department of commerce in collabora
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tion with the institute of human relations of the law school of
Yale. Their report has this to say:
In tabulations of the causes of business failure, one frequently
finds “lack of capital” near the top of the list. This is easily
understood. In viewing the failed concern, with its huge debts
and small assets, both debtors and creditors have a tendency in
correctly to attribute the failure to lack of capital. They look
back over the months preceding failure, when the debtor had dif
ficulty in raising money to meet his obligations, and the matter
seemed obvious; he failed because he lacked capital.
Lack of capital was not an important cause of failure in the
cases studied. In most of these cases where failure was attributed
to lack of capital, something else was the cause. These individ
uals had control over all the capital they could efficiently ad
minister; in fact, in a few instances, the figures seemed to indicate
that too much capital, rather than too little, contributed to the
downfall. The owners of the businesses had received generous
extensions of credit, the proceeds of which had been used up
gradually through lack of proper management. They then
lacked capital, it is true, but this condition was a result of failure,
rather than a cause of it. Undoubtedly at times competent busi
ness men launch themselves on enterprises with possibilities for
success, and are forced into failure because, for some reason or
other, they are unable to secure credit to carry on the business;
but these cases are rare and were inconspicuous in the New Jersey
study. . . .

Unwise credit, it therefore would appear, has had little to do
with the many failures. It has been responsible for only one
per cent. of the total. Here there seems to be a conflict of causes.
Undoubtedly, many failures attributed to laxity in granting credit
have been classified under lack of capital, incompetence or in
experience. The fact that these are general causes, any one of
which might embrace unwise credit, leads me to believe that
Bradstreet might have classified some of our victims of “unwise
credit” as “incompetents.” That he was incompetent might
easily be said about a person who had not recognized the im
portance of collecting his accounts. It is hard to perceive how a
person can fail because of his laxity in extending credit without his
being either incompetent or inexperienced. It is much like a
doctor’s saying that the death of one of his patients was due to
some infectious disease, while that of another, who suffered alike,
was due to his heart’s ceasing to function. Since it is nothing
more than a “hangover” from injudicious selling, unwise credit
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most certainly is a form of either incompetence or inexperience or
both.
In nearly all the failed concerns with which I have come in
contact during the past twelve years, credit losses have been
heavy. Particularly is this true in the case of small businesses.
The New Jersey study revealed that bad-debt losses in some in
stances were as high as 40% of open credit sales. Concerning
credit and credit losses, the investigators’ report reads thus:
The poor credit methods of the businesses which failed are
evidenced by the large losses on bad debts. . . . For the year
preceding failure the average bad debt loss on open credit . . .
was 7.2% [of credit sales]. The average loss on instalment credit
was 17.1%. . . . According to the reports of the national retail
credit survey conducted by the department of commerce, the
average open-credit loss for all types of retailers was 0.6%.

The difference, then, between the average percentages of credit
losses of the successful and the unsuccessful would indicate that
unwise credit has had a great deal to do with the many failures.
Regardless of how efficiently it is run otherwise, no retail business
can survive when it loses continually in worthless accounts 17%—
or even 7%—of its sales. The foregoing percentages are, I think,
representative of the whole country. Certainly New Jersey does
not differ from other states in this matter.
To account for such a large percentage of credit losses is not
difficult. To begin with, the average small merchant often sells
his goods to persons who he knows are “deadbeats,” thinking that
they will pay him when they do not pay others. In other words,
he is momentarily more interested in making the sale than in
whether or not he will eventually collect for it.
As a matter of fact, very few small-business men avail them
selves of the services of their local credit exchange or association,
whose files contain the credit history of almost every local buyer.
In order to save the cost of membership, which is often nominal,
many small merchants extend credit without inquiring into the
credit standing of their customers. As a result, these small
merchants often lose in bad accounts in the course of a year much
more than would be their cost of membership.
The credit exchange, needless to say, is a necessary adjunct to
modern business. These exchanges, located in nearly every city
or town of any consequence, have had more than anything else
to do with stabilizing and strengthening credit all over the
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country. Many persons who otherwise would not pay their bills,
knowing that their local credit association keeps a record of how
they meet their obligations, now pay.
Recently I asked a credit exchange manager how many small,
local merchants were members of his association. “Not over
25%,” he answered. Of the New Jersey failures, whose credit
losses and credit methods were studied, the percentage was much
smaller than that. “Of the 238 businesses reporting on the sub
ject, 32, or 13.4%, used credit bureaus, and 206, or 86.6%, did
not. ...”
It is generally conceded that poor management is the parent
cause of business failure. Particularly is this true in the case of
small businesses.
Now why should there be so few good managers among small
business men? Not long ago I asked one of my clients, a success
ful small merchant, his views on the question. “They are,” he
said, “unable to manage themselves. And those who do pretend
to mind their affairs,” he added, “never accomplish anything, for
the simple reason that they persist in sticking to methods which
are as out of date as hoopskirts.”
Here is sounded, probably, the keynote to the whole score.
Very often—too often, no doubt—business men, both large and
small, become engrossed in matters foreign to their own businesses.
Golf, which is now indulged in by the proletariat as well as those
higher up the business ladder, has perhaps drawn the minds of
many away from their businesses. The increase in the number of
golf courses and in the manufacture of golf paraphernalia since the
war tends to show the plausibility of this conjecture. This brings
to mind another example not dissimilar, and that is the large
number of men who, before the market crash in 1929, dissipated
much of their time watching the blackboards in the offices of their
brokers. I know of several who invested in stocks at inflated
prices (on margin) more than they had in their own businesses.
Good merchandising is probably the most vital factor in the
success of a business enterprise. Yet nearly all that a vast num
ber of small business executives know about it is buying something
for one price and selling it for another. Such problems as over
stocks, overhead—that is, keeping the expense under the margin
of gross profit—little concern them.
Like the extension of credit, the importance of bookkeeping is
often underestimated. More often the rule than the exception,
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the small-business man seems to believe that bookkeeping is a use
less adornment, one which only adds to his overhead—something
which only his larger competitor can afford. He never stops to
consider that comprehensible records can be made to “pay for
their keep” in information which can be used in the constructive
management of affairs.
The New Jersey investigators found that over 50% of those
whose bookkeeping methods were studied kept inadequate
records. “Of 408 businesses for which information was secured
on this point 96 (25.5%) kept no books at all, 120 (29.4%) kept
books which were inadequate for the purpose of showing the condi
tion of the business, and 192 (47.1%) kept books which might
be described as adequate. . . .”
It may be said, then, in all propriety, that the lack of proper
records or of any at all has contributed largely to many failures.
It can hardly have been a coincidence that most of the concerns
whose failures were studied kept books which were said to be
inadequate.
“But this is the age of the specialist.” How often have we
heard these or similar words. While specialized knowledge may
be an essential of the mental equipment of a large-business execu
tive, it sometimes proves to be an impediment to his small-busi
ness contemporary. For instance, a man with years of experi
ence in the purchasing department of a large corporation might
venture into the field of small business and fail. Such a man
might place undue emphasis upon the buying function to the
neglect of others and buy himself into bankruptcy. In fact, a
specialist in a small business is wholly out of place. I know of
three recent failures which were largely due to the fact that the
men in charge put too much stress upon one phase of management
—selling. They paid little or no attention to the others, which
they thought of little consequence. These men were good sales
men and nothing else. It never occurred to them that their grab
bag buying and their trial-and-error methods of administration
would overshadow their ability to sell. I here mention overselling
and overbuying, not because they are necessarily the most serious
breaches of good management, but mainly because they are
believed to be the two most common causes of failure. “Over”
anything else, of course, can be equally hazardous.
Even if I were capable of discussing the many phases of manage
ment, I could hardly do so here for lack of space. Besides, this
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article is intended to be one of diagnosis rather than prescription.
Moreover, anything that might be said would be perhaps only a
repetition of the platitudes with which the most of us are already
familiar. The whole field of management, as I see it, so far as it
concerns the small-business man, can be summarized in a very few
words: He must know something about almost everything related
to his business, since it is not large enough to warrant his employ
ing others experienced in the several branches—buying, selling,
credits and collections, accounting, personnel, etc.—to assist him.
In short, he must make himself an all-around executive, one who
can wrestle with and solve the many problems of present-day
management.
One of the most familiar cries of the small-business man these
days is “competition.” He considers it probably the most
dangerous of his common enemies. Competition is, in most
cases, however, an excuse for failure, rather than a cause of it.
Conversely, competition sometimes has a good effect; it tends to
lessen the number of failures by forcing the less progressive to put
into practice in their own businesses some of the efficiency
responsible for the success of their competitors. A further indica
tion of the stimulating effect of competition, in some cases, is the
fact that many businesses thrive in groups.
Proving that there is still virtue in the old adage, “In union
there is strength,” many kinds of businesses have found it
profitable to band together for research in their respective fields.
Cost, expense and earning figures are exchanged by the members
of the various groups. Nearly all the large department stores—
and many of the smaller ones also—are affiliated with the National
Retail Dry Goods Association and the bureau of business research
of Harvard for the mutual exchange of information beneficial to
the trade as a whole. If small-business men were to organize
themselves in a similar way, study the methods of their successful
colleagues and make a serious attempt to analyze and to eliminate
their own individual deficiencies, they would have little to fear
from their imaginary enemies, the “chains” and the large
independents.
It is conceded that the national recovery act has been rather
disappointing to the “new dealers” generally in its failure to
bring about a large measure of recovery. The inequities of the
N.R.A., so far as they concern the small-business man, have been
brought to our attention many times during the past year and
98

Business Failures and the Small-Business Man
need no repetition here. Regardless of what we may say about it,
it has at least stimulated the tendency of business generally to or
ganize. Independent wholesalers and retailers are forming buy
ing pools, which are nothing more than unions. The National
Retailers Council is calling to arms retailers in all lines for the
purpose of organizing to promote cooperative buying. As this
movement gains momentum, the large national “chains” will
have a powerful foe with which to reckon.
As I see it, all retailers—and this includes the “chains” as well
—have most to fear the present tendency of consumers themselves
to organize—to band together and deal direct with manufacturers
and producers. This movement, in fact, is spreading rapidly.
But what, it might be asked, of the public’s attitude toward the
small-business man? Has it undergone any material change dur
ing this era of “scientific” management? As a lay observer, I
would say that it has not; on the contrary, the public still has a
deep affection for him, although he does not always believe it.
The average consumer will continue to patronize him, provided he
will put forth some effort to keep pace with the times.
About all that the “chains ” and the large independents offer the
public in competition with the small-business man are prices
somewhat lower than his. Even this is a moot question, if we
stop to place a value upon the service which the independent
merchant often renders. Many housewives never seem to con
sider it. Let us assume that the “chains” do undersell him.
Even so, the price differential is often negligible. In fact, the
“chains’” low prices are in many instances a myth. When the
difference is small, as is the case generally, it seldom offsets the
personal appeal, that of the friend and neighbor. Everything
else being nearly equal, the average buyer likes to transact busi
ness with someone whom he knows intimately, someone who mani
fests a genuine interest in his welfare and in that of his family.
Since the war many of the larger concerns have attempted to
invoke the social aspect as a kind of antidote to competition.
They have sought to employ clerks with a wide acquaintance in
the city or town, chosen not for their business acumen or their
knowledge of what their employer has to sell, but for their ability
to “break down the customer’s sales resistance.” But somehow
these concerns have not been quite able to imitate this air of
friendliness, which is, and always has been, one of the small
business man’s chief assets. The small-business man, it seems,
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has a monopoly in the art of injecting a spirit of altruism
into his dealings with those who patronize him. He does not
always know, however, when it reaches a point of diminishing
returns.
One never hears a discussion about competition nowadays
without something said about the chain-store “menace.” Many
believe that the “chains” are threatening to make threadbare our
whole economic fabric. This may be so; but I, for one, am not
yet convinced of it. Although the chain-store scheme is nearly a
hundred years old, it appears to be still more or less an experi
ment, in view of the number of changes in the methods of mer
chandising which may have been effected in the past decade and
the number of stores which have come and gone in our cities and
towns. Nor do the compilations of the bureau of the census,
whose figures are probably the most trustworthy that we have,
indicate that the business of the chains has reached the gargan
tuan size that many would have us believe. The census reported
that in 1930 only 10% of the retail stores were chains and that
they made 21% of the total retail sales. It reports also that their
main activity has been confined to four or five retail businesses,
principally groceries, clothing and shoes. The ill effects of chain
competition, then, would appear to be more imaginary than
real. At least, these figures should relieve the minds of those
who have felt that the “chains” are gobbling up most of the
retail business!
I do not mean to imply that the small, local merchants have not
suffered from chain competition, for they have. There is
scarcely a village or hamlet that does not have its “ DizzyLizzy” specialty store or its “Willy-Nilly” grocery, competing
for a share of the meager trade. It is also true that the “chains,”
through their large purchasing power, their ability to employ
competent people in all departments, and their careful control
over stock and capital turnovers, have reduced to no little degree
the sales and profits of the small storekeepers.
Whether the “chains” will continue to thrive remains to be
seen. As Stuart Chase has said: “The ‘chains’ are locked in
sanguinary struggles among themselves—there are just so many
prize locations on main street.” In his book Prosperity: Fact or
Myth, written in 1929 and published in July, 1930, he tells us that
in a survey of 500 independent grocery store failures, it was found
that 65% were due to inexperience; 17% to fires, floods, robbery
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and sickness; 17% to character breakdown; and that only 1.4%
were due to competition. One’s behavior, then, would seem to
have something to do with one’s success in business!
Today many problems confront the “chains.” The most im
portant perhaps is high rent. Many chain-store operators now
have a veritable millstone around their necks in the form of leases
at high rentals which were made when it looked is if the bubble
of prosperity, radiating every color of the spectrum, would remain
afloat indefinitely. The second in importance, probably, is that,
in recent years, much propaganda has been spread depicting the
chains’ damaging effects to our community life and standards of
living. To combat the enemy, independent merchants have en
listed their city, town and even their state officers and many
consumers into a vast army, one ready to defend the home mer
chants against the “invasion.” The state in which I live (Louisi
ana) has been recently added to the list of those that have enacted
legislation aimed at the large national chains. The tax bill
passed by the last regular session of the legislature levies a tax
ranging from $10 to $550 upon each individual store in the state,
depending upon the number of stores each owner operates all over
the United States. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Com
pany, which operates about one hundred stores in Louisiana, will
thus pay a tax of some $50,000 a year.
The local merchant’s grievance against the chains is familiar to
us all. For that reason I hesitate to repeat it. But since it is
necessary in order to show the fallacy of it, I shall do so anyway.
It is argued that the chains send away from the community all, or
nearly all, the money they take in and that very little ever gets
back to the local people by way of local expenditures. Even upon
cursory analysis there seems to be little to support such an argu
ment. The chains, like the home merchants, are dependent upon
the communities in which they operate. If the community is not
prosperous, certainly they can not prosper. The chains, more
over, can not monopolize the business unless they can greatly
undersell their local competitors—which some of us believe they
can not do.
The chains, as I view it, are presently caught in a vise—high
rent on the one side and a steadily rising tide of prejudice against
them on the other. And the grip on the tightening screw is held
by none other than two of the home folk, the local real-estate
owner and the local merchant. The former has behind him his
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monthly maturing rent notes, and the latter his organized force of
propagandists—his friends, neighbors and sympathizers.
It has not been my desire, as I have tried to make clear, to air
the deficiencies of the small-business man. In this discussion of
the causes of failure, I have attempted merely to show that most
of the failures have been due, not to the small businesses having
become antiquated, but largely to the small-business men them
selves, who have been reluctant to follow a formula which might
insure success.
The average small-business man has been slow to seek out the
real cause of his adversity. In centering on what he believes it to
be, he has accused, as I stated at the beginning, those who have
little to do with it. Chains and independents larger than he have
sprung up around him and from outward appearances have
prospered, while he has failed to prosper; hence his confirmed be
lief that the competition they have given him has been wholly
responsible for his inability to succeed.
Perhaps he ought not to be censured for believing this, since to
blame others for that for which we ourselves are to blame is a most
common trait of human nature. Rarely does one attempt a
critical analysis of one’s self and of one’s own shortcomings. The
real reason, I think, that the small-business man's perspective is
somewhat distorted is that the transition of modern business has
been gradual—too gradual for him to see the changes which have
taken place around him and to recognize their significance.
In the past decade, business has undergone a complete trans
formation. The transformation has been for a makeshift tool to
an intricate machine, a machine whose wheels have to be lubri
cated if it is to function properly. Guesswork, to put it plainly,
has been supplanted by sound business methods.
The present economic dilemma has brought about many
reversals of the old order. For one thing, control of many of the
large concerns has passed into the hands of the bankers, whose
ability to run them appears indeed questionable, if we stop to
consider the wholesale bank failures during the three years preced
ing the bank “holiday.” The utter collapse of the whole banking
structure on the day the “new deal” took office should convince
the most credulous that the bankers have their hands full getting
their own house in order. Moreover, a great many of us are not so
sure that the bankers are capable of managing alien businesses.
While corporate stockholders may not be asking pertinent ques
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tions about dividends, they are still wondering why there have
been such large shrinkages in the value of their holdings. This
alone is causing both the bankers and the corporate managers
deep concern, especially those of the former who sold or unwit
tingly recommended securities to their customers.
As for the chains, the depression has made it difficult for many
of them to keep up the pace at which they traveled a few years
ago. One of the largest, a drug chain, two or three years ago
went so far as to champion a bill in the national congress to
prohibit price-cutting, not only in its own field, but in every other.
Thus we see, strange as it may seem, a nauseous prescription
forced upon the one concocting it. Thus we see that price-cutting
has reacted forcefully, if not forcibly, against one of those initiat
ing the practice.
Obviously, in times like these it becomes necessary for execu
tives, both large and small, to pursue a policy of retrenchment.
And it is here that the small business has a decided advantage.
It is more flexible; it can effect economies much quicker than the
average big business and thus enhance its chances of survival.
Many have done this. "Hard times,” as Charles G. Ross said,
in an article some time ago in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, “have
produced hard thinking.” The small-business man who has thus
far escaped the clutches of the sheriff and has managed to hold on
to enough of his capital to enable him to carry on is in a strategic
position, a far better position than some of his larger competitors.
Contrary to the belief of many, I see little evidence to support
the theory that the small business will eventually be obliterated.
Those who believe that the small business is going the way of some
of our other traditions have not, I think, sought out the real cause
of the many failures.
While the number of small businesses—or the number of larger
ones, for that matter—may not materially increase until we can
find some cure for our economic ills, everything points to a stur
dier, sounder small business in the future. Many of the formerly
successful larger businesses are now small businesses, and the
depleted ranks of the small-business men are being rapidly filled
in with recruits. These recruits, fall, roughly, into two groups:
First, we have the thousands of graduates of the schools of
commerce of our universities who, upon entering college a few
years ago, envisioned mahogany desks and fat salaries, which
usually go with executive positions in the big corporations.
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These would-be Rockefellers and Carnegies have had to go back
home, whether they wanted to or not. In brief, General Motors’
“loss” has been the general store’s gain.
Secondly, we have those whom we looked upon some few years
ago as “big-business” men, by virtue of their employment with
the large corporations, who have since joined the ranks of the un
employed. These men, having been cast adrift by concerns
whose executives thought it necessary to reduce their personnel
to keep from failing or had uppermost in their minds the protec
tion of that all-important personage, the stockholder, are opening
up small businesses themselves. And—most encouraging thing
of all—they are bringing their efficiency with them.
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